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“Anything but Lovely”

The Canadian Corps at Lens
in the summer of 1917
Geoff Jackson

M

uch has been written on the Canadian Corps
and the string of victories that it achieved
after its initial triumph at Vimy Ridge.1 The corps
did not have a perfect record after Vimy, although
the battles are often depicted as such. The attack
on the town of Lens in August 1917 demonstrated
that the corps was still capable of making
mistakes that were extremely costly in casualties
and did not garner any sort of victory.
Examining the battle of Lens will dispel
some of the myths. The brief literature on Hill
70 and Lens has always lumped them together
as a single battle with a victorious outcome.2
In fact, this is misleading. The attack on Lens,
which immediately followed the highly successful
assault on Hill 70, was a defeat, and an avoidable
one. Hill 70 was an operation involving 14
assaulting battalions launched on a much wider
front than the seven attacking battalions that led
the assault into Lens. Lens was not a probing
assault that followed the success of Hill 70 – it
was a set-piece battle that the Canadian Corps
Headquarters planned in July.3 This paper will
show why the same sort of set-piece battle plan
the Canadians applied with such success at Vimy
Ridge and Hill 70 failed at Lens.
The Third Battle of Ypres, otherwise known
as Passchendaele, began on 31 July when
General Hubert Gough’s Fifth Army launched the
British attack on Pilkem Ridge.4 On 7 July, Field
Marshal Douglas Haig ordered a simultaneous
diversionary attack at Lens in order to draw
German forces away from the primary British
front.5 Haig was right. In the German official
history, Der Weltkrieg, Hermann von Kuhl
wrote:

The situation in Crown Prince Rupprecht’s army
group was serious and caused its commander
considerable worry. With anxiety, he had to look
at other fronts, to the areas of Lens, Arras and
St. Quentin, where an enemy attack could be
expected at any time, even if it took the form of
a secondary attack.6

The Canadian Corps spent the next month
preparing for this attack at the behest of General
Henry Horne, commander of the British First
Army, which at the time had the Canadian Corps
attached.
The forthcoming operations at Lens would
be Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie’s first as
corps commander. From the outset, he was
concerned about the implications of attacking
Lens from the front as Field Marshal Haig had
requested. Indeed, on receiving the order, he
had climbed a high point behind the Canadian
lines (near Bois de l’Hirondelle) and lay there the
entire morning, carefully surveying the terrain.
Lens was situated between the Salaumines Hills
to the southeast and Hill 70 to the north. Currie
concluded that the Canadian Corps would suffer
enormous casualties if it attacked Lens without
neutralizing these heights. A direct assault on
Lens would mean that the corps would have to
deploy its troops and artillery on the Douai plain
in front of its objective,7 providing the German
artillery with excellent targets. On 10 July,
having scouted the proposed battlefield, Currie
approached General Horne and recommended
an alternative plan.8 Realizing the cost in lives
of a direct attack on Lens, Currie insisted that
it made more tactical sense to capture Hill 70,
hopefully causing the German defence of Lens to
collapse and either forcing the enemy to evacuate
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Right: Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie (at right, pointing), commander
of the Canadian Corps, devised a brilliant plan for the Hill 70 battle, but
was less successful in his attempt to capture the city of Lens.

the city or to try to retake the heights.9 However,
it was understood that even after taking Hill
70 the Canadian Corps might still be required
to enter Lens. The assumption was that its
defences would be considerably weakened.10
Changing Haig’s and Horne’s original plan was
a bold move considering that Currie had been
corps commander for barely a month. Horne,
however, was persuaded by Currie’s arguments,
and authorized the Canadian general and his staff
to proceed with the new plan.
After a delay of two weeks because of
poor weather, time Canadian gunners used to
extend the “softening-up” bombardment, the
1st and 2nd Divisions assaulted Hill 70 on the
morning of 15 August. The attack on Hill 70
was a textbook example of how a set-piece battle
should be carried out, with only minor setbacks
suffered by two of the brigades.11 There was
massive artillery support before and during
the assault, the objectives set for the infantry
were limited, and machine guns were employed
to an unprecedented degree in support of the
advancing troops and to defend captured terrain.
The Canadians had the energy and time to dig
into their new positions and wait for the German
counterattacks.12 Moreover, the enemy responded
as Currie had predicted, launching numerous
counterattacks over the next four days, many of
them broken up by the Canadian artillery and
machine guns with heavy losses to the Germans.13

On the night of 18 August, after four days of hard
fighting, Currie wrote in his diary:
There were no fewer than twenty-one counterattacks delivered, many with very large forces
and all with great determination and dash….Our
casualties so far about 5600 but in my opinion
the enemy casualties must be close to 20,000.
Our gunners, machine-gunners and infantry
never had such targets, F[orward]O[bservation]O
[fficer]s could not get guns for all their targets…
It was a great and wonderful victory. G.H.Q.
regard it as one of the finest performances of
the war…14

Currie’s estimates of the German casualties,
though unsubstantiated, point to how
overwhelmingly successful the Hill 70 operation
had been. Victories of this proportion seldom
happened on the Western Front. With this battle
the Canadian Corps had achieved the goals that
had been set out for it by British High Command
and had drained away German units that would
otherwise have been of use in the Ypres salient,
specifically the three divisions sent to the Hill 70
area between 15 and 20 August.15 However, the
Canadian Corps, now holding the high ground
and flush with victory, looked down from Hill 70
and decided to press on and attack Lens. This
proved to be a costly mistake.
In the official history, Nicholson aptly
described Lens as “the center of the most crowded
coal-mining area in France…which lay in partial
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ruin, encircled by a wreath of shattered pithead
installations.”16 Certainly, its ruins offered plenty
of strongpoints for the German defences. In the
lead up to the attack on Hill 70, the 4th Division
had been sending raiding parties into Lens as
part of a diversionary effort to make the Germans
think that the main attack would fall on the town
rather than the nearby heights. These raids had
made it clear that, wishful thinking at Corps
headquarters aside, the Germans would mount
a strong defence of the city.
Nonetheless, pushing the Germans out of
Lens was always part of the Canadian plan if
the Hill 70 operation was successful. This is
demonstrated in the corps’ orders released in
late July 1917, which emphasized that “offensive
operations with the ultimate object of the capture
of LENS are to be continued by the Canadian
Corps.”17 In light of the substantial German
reinforcements already thrown at Hill 70, it is
likely that the pressure from Horne and Haig to
draw away still more divisions from Ypres must
have been substantial.18 Indeed, a month after
the Canadian debacle at Lens, the British High
Command was still pushing the corps to take the
city.19
Currie should have realized that if the
German garrison chose to stand and fight, the
task of taking Lens was completely different from
(and much more difficult than) the capture of Hill
70, and quite possibly best avoided. But with
the capture of Hill 70, the Canadian command
appears to have felt that they were now in a
favourable position to assault the city, and Currie
and his staff planned to repeat what they had
done so successfully only days earlier at Hill 70.
Though the attack on Lens would not have the
element of surprise that the initial attack had had,
the corps’ leadership felt that the combination of
limited objectives, ample artillery support and
solid intelligence would once more guarantee
success.
A significant difference between the Hill 70
operation and the Lens attack was that the troops
did not prepare for Lens in the same manner as
the attack on Hill 70. In the latter case, the assault
troops had moved into position on 18 and 19
July and had gone through detailed rehearsals
over taped courses so that by the time the attack
was carried out on 15 August the troops had a
thorough knowledge of the tactics to be used and

objectives to be gained.20 Lens, however, was a
different story. The 4th Division had been in front
of Lens for a month before its scheduled attack,
and had been constantly raiding the city for over
three weeks. However, instructions as to which
brigades (and battalions) would be used and
what objectives the assault hoped to achieve were
only handed down from Division between the
16 and 18 August.21 The attacks were supposed
to fall on the morning of the 20th, “but were
postponed to the 21st, owing to preparations not
having been completed.”22 Basically, the artillery
supporting the 1st and 2nd Division lines had to
be reoriented on Lens instead of Hill 70, and the
assault troops were not all in position.23
Currie’s plan called for the 2nd and 4th
Divisions to take part in this attack. While the
planned advance was not deep, the route lay
through ruined buildings, and with a width of
3,000 yards, was considered a broad front.
The 2nd Division was to occupy Cinnabar
and Combat trenches in the suburb of Cité St.
Elizabeth, located just north of the center of
Lens, while the 4th Division was assigned Aloof,
Aconite, and Alpaca trenches which ran through
the Lens city centre. The plan further called for
the troops that took Aloof and Combat trenches,
the 4th and 2nd Divisions’ adjacent flanks, to link
up, forming a continuous advance line.24
On 18 August, the corps commander and
his staff set 21 August for the launch of the Lens
operation.25 The Canadian infantry would now
be undertaking urban combat, an entirely new
venture for which they had no training. A private
who took part in the assault remembered his
foreboding at the prospect:
You see, the houses were built in long rows and
they had knocked bricks out of each house and
built a tunnel through. You could move two or
three streets, out of sight. Don’t forget this, the
Germans had been there for about twelve or
thirteen months.26

2nd Division Attack

A

t 0435 hours on the morning of 21 August
the 27th and 29th Battalions would lead the
initial assault on Lens with the 28th Battalion
in immediate support and the 31st Battalion in
reserve. The artillery coverage for the units, all of
the 6th Brigade, was similar to that which the 2nd
7
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A shell bursts in the outskirts of Lens, August 1917.

By 0345 hours, the two battalions had
assumed their positions in the jump-off line.
Carl von Clausewitz wrote that no other activity
is as continuously or universally bound up with
chance as war.28 As chance would have it, the
Germans and Canadians attacked each other
on this frontage almost simultaneously. Since
0300 hours, the Germans had been shelling
the Canadian front lines, the rate continuing to
increase as the morning progressed. At 0425
hours, the Germans blanketed the 5th and 6th
Brigade lines (the former were holding the line
to the left of the latter) with a heavy artillery and
trench mortar bombardment for eight minutes.29
Ten minutes before the 6th Brigade was supposed
to launch its attack, fresh German troops of the
1st Guards Reserve Division, which had moved
into position the previous day, hurled themselves

at the 5th Brigade’s lines in a massive assault. In
the ensuing chaotic fighting, the 5th Brigade was
ejected from its trenches. A counterattack, led by
the 25th Battalion, was able to regain a foothold
in the original positions later in the morning.30
As an intelligence report from the 25th Battalion
recorded:
A lively scrap ensued in which our men fought
their way out of the dug-outs, and began to drive
Germans from our trench…the troops that D
Company were opposed…were probably the best
which [we] ever encountered.31

Ten minutes after the surprise German attack,
the 6th Brigade launched its assault, only to
meet advancing German forces in no-man’sland, where the fighting was especially brutal.
As a rifleman in the 31st Battalion later wrote
of the attack:
…a battle royal took place. After bombing and
bayonet work, we slowly forced the enemy
back, meeting another line later on. After some
desperate fighting we were supposed to have
reached our objective, but with sadly depleted
forces. We had, however, to pull back leaving
outposts composed of bombers and Lewis
gunners to hold the line.32

CWM EO-1752

Division had enjoyed at Hill 70 – 102 18-pounder
field guns, twenty-four 4.5-inch howitzers and
twenty-eight medium and heavy howitzers.
In addition, several heavy artillery pieces had
been set aside purely for counter-battery work,
and Army Headquarters also added additional
artillery to support the 2nd Division’s assault in
the form of the British 63rd Artillery Group.27
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For the 6th Brigade, the fighting throughout
the day was frenzied and vicious, with most of
the battalions failing to reach their objectives,
and reserve companies of the 31st, 29th and
28th Battalions had to be rushed forward to fill
the gaps in the ranks.33 By noon, the Canadians
had failed to gain their key objectives – Nabob,
Cinnabar and Nun’s Alley trenches. By 1600
hours it was realized that the attack had failed
and that the 6th Brigade should fall back to its
original position. The day’s only saving grace
was that the German forces did not achieve their
goal of displacing the Canadian lines either.34
The 2nd Division’s official report said that the
fighting had been of a more severe nature than
any previous action by this division, though it
emphasized that the heavy casualties suffered,
and failure to gain any of the planned objectives,
were “compensated for by the very high numbers
of casualties inflicted on the enemy.”35 The 6th
Brigade suffered so badly that it had to be pulled
from the line on 22 August, the 5th Brigade being
compelled to extend its line to cover the former’s
front. This was the end of action for the 2nd
Division in the Lens area.36

4th Division Attack

T

he 4th Division also had an arduous time
fighting its way into Lens. Their assignment
was the more daunting – to press on into the
ruined city centre. The German army had spent
the last two years setting up defensive positions
in the rubble of this destroyed city and were well
prepared when the Canadians launched their
attack:
What had originally appeared to be the ruins of
workingmen’s houses on the Southern edge of
Lens were discovered to be lined and interlined
with trussed concrete. The walls were from six
to eight feet thick and practically impregnable to
even the heaviest shells. One of these pill boxes,
armed with a machine-gun could hold up an
advance on nearly a mile of front.37

Perhaps this comment exaggerates the
effectiveness of the machine guns, given that
their fields of fire were also restricted by rubble,
but entering this all-but-destroyed city riven
with underground bunkers and hidden pillboxes
would be a totally new – and deadly – type of
warfare for the Canadians.

CWM EO-1752

Canadian soldiers, some wounded, gather at an aid post during the ﬁghting at Lens, August 1917.
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On the night of 18 August the 10th Brigade
replaced the 11th Brigade in the front lines
opposite Lens. The 10th Brigade was supposed to
storm Lens on the 21st simultaneously with the
6th Brigade’s attack. However, on 20 August the
50th Battalion attempted to attack Aloof Trench
with the hope of gaining a better jumping-off
point for the next day’s operations.38 Intelligence
reports from the neighbouring 2nd Division had
led the commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel
Page, to believe that the Germans opposing them
were withdrawing and that his men would meet
weak resistance.39 The attack jumped off in the
afternoon and artillery was kept to a minimum
in order to give the Canadians the element of
surprise. After making initial progress, the 50th
Battalion assault companies ran into heavy
opposition.40 The Canadian intelligence had been
wrong – Aloof Trench was very strongly defended.
Victor Wheeler, a signaler in the Battalion, later
described the grim events of 20 August in his
memoirs:
We were engaged in nothing less than a battleto-the death with an enemy who was equally
determined that we should not pass. Many
individual acts of bravery among our heroic
men were exploits of self sacrifice-sacrifice that
might, somehow, enable their buddies to go
forward and gain the Battalion’s objective. Our
objectives gained, we thought we could hold it
against counter-move, but the boche[s] decided
otherwise. He launched a powerful counterattack against our decimated ranks with such
ferocity that his onslaught drove us back to our
original position.41

Wheeler’s Battalion lost over 50 men, pulled
back, and, during the night of 20 August, a
reserve company was sent forward to replenish
its ranks for the next day’s main assault. The
10th Brigade’s intelligence summaries noted that
the 50th Battalion should not have undertaken
the operation for it may have jeopardized the
next day’s assault by alerting the Germans and
drained the manpower of the Canadians. The
50th Battalion’s attack showed how unprepared
the Canadians were for operating in this
environment. The decision not to use artillery,
a tool that had insured success in the past, as
well as poor intelligence and determined German
resistance had resulted in a bloody setback.42
The 50th Battalion prepared for their attack
on 21 August under the heavy German shelling
that had zeroed in on their location during the
night of the 20th-21st. The infantry lay in the
open for 25 minutes under this bombardment
before beginning their attack, and by the time they
left the trenches they had already suffered heavy
casualties. As the Albertans advanced, the ruined
houses began to spit out machine-gun fire. Only
a few small parties reached their objectives. The
50th Battalion was so battered it was forced to
pull back and regroup. At 1800 hours it tried to
launch another attack, but this, too, was beaten
back. It had been a grim, costly affair, and the
Alberta men had failed to gain any of the day’s
objectives. The Canadian artillery had been of
little use against strongly-fortified defensive
positions in the rubble. The Germans had also

CWM EO-1889

A Canadian gun emplacement near Lens, August 1917. Artillery generally played a major role
during the Great War, but its effectiveness was limited due to the urban nature of the battleﬁeld.
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outwitted the Canadian artillery by launching
red signal flares similar to those employed by
the Canadian Corps, so that when the Canadian
guns responded their shells fell among the 50th
Battalion’s positions causing even more misery
(and casualties) among the troops. At day’s end,
the 50th’s last remaining reinforcements were
sent up to strengthen its much-thinned ranks.43

decided not to advance in numbers (though he
sent some minor patrols forward), but instead
consolidate the lines they had gained. The 50th
Battalion never achieved the initial objectives
laid out for them on the 21st, and they retired
that evening, relieved by the 87th Battalion. In
over four days of fighting they had suffered 370
casualties, nearly half of their strength.44

Four days later, on 25 August, the battalion
tried once more for their original objectives. This
time the Canadians were not heavily bombarded
by the German artillery. Also, the Canadian
artillery laid down a much larger barrage that
covered the advance all the way to the first line
(Aloof trench). Here, the infantry stopped and
consolidated. This time the Canadians met little
resistance, suffering only seven wounded, but
when they pushed patrols forward to gain the
rest of the objectives, they again came under
heavy machine gun fire. Lieutenant-Colonel Page

Attacks by the 46th and 47th Battalions,
also part of the 4th Division’s operation on the
21st, started badly. The Germans had heavily
shelled their positions during the previous night.
Every officer in the 46th Battalion’s leftmost
company became a casualty and others from
the reserve battalions had to be rushed forward
to replace them. Shaken by their ordeal, the
troops left their lines at the designated time of
0435 hours and quickly entered the shattered
neighbourhoods of Lens. They promptly found
themselves engaged in house-to-house fighting.
11
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Planning for the attack on the Green Crassier was carried out by Major-General David Watson, commander of 4th Canadian Division (left); his
senior staff ofﬁcer, Brigadier William Ironsides (centre), and the commander of 10th Brigade, Brigadier-General Edward Hilliam (right).

The fighting through Lens was fierce, but both
battalions were consolidating their objectives by
early evening,47 a success that was unmatched
along the rest of the Canadian lines that day.

The Green Crassier

D

espite the complete failure of 2nd Division’s
initiative, with the success that the 46th and
47th Battalions had achieved, corps headquarters
believed that the second part of the advance into
Lens, the attack on the Green Crassier, would
be feasible. The struggle for the Green Crassier
would be the defining element in the Canadian
Corps’ battle to capture Lens. If taken, the
Canadians would have three sides of the city
enclosed, and they expected that this would make
the German position in Lens untenable and force
the enemy to withdraw.48 The Green Crassier was
a large mound of mine refuse, located between
the railway station and the Lens Canal, and 350
yards to the right of the 10th Brigade’s position. A
private in the 44th Battalion described it as a:
Tremendous thing, it stood up as a land mark,
it stood about roughly 500 yards to the side, in
the shape of triangles, heart shaped, with the
points down towards us, and toward the Lens-

CWM 19850298-011

Bombs would be concealed in small dugout
stoves, with wires attached to the doors.
Naturally enough, a door would be opened
sooner or later, and immediately the safety pin
would be released and the bomb would explode,
doing considerable damage to the garrison.46

Arras railway. Now they had the damned Souches
[Souchez] River right near that place and it
had flooded the whole area and the crassier
something like an arrow point ….49

Urban warfare is particularly brutal and
arduous, and the Canadian Corps had no
experience in this sort of fighting. The tactics of
heavy and accurate artillery support and storming
trenches was of little use in Lens – the heavy
casualties that the Canadian rifle companies
had been taking in the Lens area should
have confirmed this. Brigade and divisional
commanders seem not to have recognized how
much harder the fighting would be. Instead, they
believed that the tactics of a limited bite-and-hold
and artillery-intensive attack would succeed in
gaining the Green Crassier.50 The 4th Division
headquarters (Major-General David Watson and
his senior staff officer, Brigadier William Ironside)
as well as Lieutenant-General Arthur Currie and
Canadian Corps headquarters should have reevaluated what they wanted to achieve at Lens.
Especially in light of the overwhelming failures in
the last couple of days of fighting to gain any sort
of foothold in Lens, and seen whether these goals
warranted the probable expenditure of life. After
nearly a week of fighting in Lens – a combination
of sporadic attacks and one major assault – the
Canadians realized that the Germans were
heavily fortified in the city and willing to fight for
it. For Lieutenant Burns, a signal officer for the
4th Division, the memory of the tenacity of the
defence against even the earliest probing attacks
into Lens was only too clear in his memoirs:
“[we] push[ed] forward fighting patrols toward
Lens to test enemy defence there (which it turned
out was solid).”51 The decision to capture the
Green Crassier was left to the 10th Brigade’s

CWM EO-4491

Any buildings the Germans had not fortified were
booby-trapped.45 As an anonymous Canadian
participant recounted:

CWM 19920165-109

LAC PA 2116

LAC PA 1352 [centre]; CWM EO 0268 [right]
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Various views of the “Green
Crassier” – the objective of the
10th Brigade attack. Though
these photos were taken in
1919, they clearly show how
the Crassier dominates the
terrain, along with the ﬂooding
of the Souchez River.

CWM EO-4491

on (left); his
(right).
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commander, Brigadier-General E. Hilliam, who
was confident that the risks involved were worth
the opportunity to have the high point to the south
of Lens in Canadian hands.52
The 44th Battalion, a Manitoba unit, was
chosen to attack the Green Crassier. Commanded
by Lieutenant-Colonel R.D. Davies, it had been
kept in reserve throughout the fighting in August.
The plan was to push forward to the Green
Crassier, and once it was taken, twist left to face
the central district of Lens.53 This advance would
be carried out on a very narrow approach to the
Green Crassier – on one side was a river, and the
Germans held most of the surrounding built up
areas except for a tight corridor that intelligence
predicted the Canadian attackers would be able
to secure. This route passed by Fosse St. Louis,
one of the many pithead installations scattered
around the area. Scouts reported, erroneously
as it turned out, that this area and the route to
the Crassier were relatively clear of Germans.54
Captain Marshall, a junior officer in the 44th,
later recounted his own astonished reaction to
the plan:
…a communiqué came out from Company HQ
said, to all Company commanders…to submit
plans to take attack and attack the Green
Crassier as a Company operation. Well it was
such a colossal proposition – this man Bruff,
wonderful man, kept everybody in excellent
humour, and so I thought it was a joke…and
answered it in a joking way, figuring it was the
thing to do. Told them, well the thing to do was…
to attack in single file mind you up the railway
embankment and have a couple of battleships
and submarines. Well I got snapped up so fast
on that, it would make your hair curl so I missed
that show. I was under open arrest.55

Both corps and divisional headquarters
believed they could take the Green Crassier,
surrounded by a maze of ruined buildings, with
the same tactics that had been used successfully
at Hill 70 – employing an infantry attack
supported by a heavy artillery bombardment.
Messages sent from corps headquarters on 19
August confirmed this: “The most important
Artillery target in our operation is the GREEN
CRASSIER. This must be thoroughly isolated
both during and after [emphasis in the original]
the operation.” Another communiqué from Corps
Headquarters reiterated the necessity of proper
artillery coverage: “Too much cannot be made of

neutralizing the Green Crassier after the assault
has succeeded because it dominates the right
flank and casualties will be heavy if it is not
properly dealt with.”56 Major-General Watson
informed Brigadier-General Hilliam that if the
46th and 47th achieved their goals, the 44th
Battalion would attack the Green Crassier. “A”
and “D” Companies would lead the assault with
“C” Company held back as reinforcements. “B”
Company was unavailable as it had been used to
reinforce the 46th Battalion in the previous day’s
fighting.57
Sending in only one undermanned battalion
to take such a crucial target was one of the
first errors the 10th Brigade made in its attack
plan. Around 2300 hours on 22 August it was
decided that the 44th Battalion would need more
support and that elements of the 50th Battalion
would be sent to aid in the assault on the Green
Crassier. However, through the chaos at the front
of Aloof Trench, the 50th Battalion could not get
organized in time. As Lieutenant-Colonel Page
recounted: “About 2:45 I received a message from
Major Graham timed at 2:20 informing me that
he was not going to attack. It was impossible for
me to make other arrangements between then
and 3:00.”58 The 44th would attack the Green
Crassier alone.
Early in the morning of 23 August a Canadian
patrol reported that Fosse St. Louis was not as
weakly held as intelligence had been reporting.
The 44th Battalion decided that once the attack
started they would send two platoons to deal
with it while the rest of the battalion headed
for the Green Crassier.59 The Canadian artillery
thundered to life at 0300 hours when the 44th
Battalion left their trenches and began their
approach to the Green Crassier. The leading
forces met only sporadic German resistance on
the route to the Green Crassier and left these
to be mopped up by the following companies.
By 0330 hours, “D” Company was on top of
its objective, the Crassier’s summit, and “A”
Company was at the base of the hill, keeping
communications open with “D” Company.60 Their
initial success gave the Canadians a false sense
of achievement.
While this attack was unfolding, the two
platoons attacking Fosse St. Louis had met with
severe resistance. Machine guns had begun
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German defences in Fosse St. Louis (shown here in 1919) took a heavy toll on the attacking troops from the 44th
Battalion. The rubble worked to the Germans’ advantage by hiding their defensive works and making it difﬁcult for the
Canadians to move forward.

firing from buildings surrounding the pithead,
and the Canadian troops were struggling to
make headway. Reinforcements were rushed to
the pithead and at 0830 hours the Canadians
reported that they had a foothold in the area.
This success, however, proved short lived. “B”
Company, which was holding Alpaca Trench, a
narrow route to the Green Crassier, desperately
needed help, and the troops attacking the pithead
were pulled back to aid them.61
As the hours passed, the Canadian units
below the Green Crassier increasingly came
under attack. It was discovered that the Germans
had tunnels leading to pithead installations and
were funneling troops through them.62 Private
Reid, a veteran of the fighting, subsequently
described how ineffective the Canadian artillery
was in this battle:
Well then they could put all their forces in there
and you could pound it for 48 hours with the
biggest barrage that you had and it made no
effect you see. Well the minute the barrage lifted
these Germans would come out you see and
set up their guns. Because I know from one
dugout they had set [the] gun that the minute
you popped your head around the corner, they
just plugged you.63

A foundation of the corps’ doctrine in the

summer of 1917 was the ability of artillery to
break up enemy counterattacks and to neutralize
their defences prior to a Canadian attack. This
was not possible in Lens. The Germans hid in
their tunnels and bunkers waiting out the artillery
bombardments. Once these lifted they would
emerge to man their weapons. The problem
was that the Canadians did not know where
the bunkers and tunnels were in this urban
environment, and usually only identified their
locations when they came under fire.64 Also,
the Germans, with their hidden fortifications
in Lens, were able to call down artillery upon
themselves. In the early afternoon, the Germans
pulled back to their tunnels and brought down a
fierce bombardment on the Canadian positions
at Alpaca Trench and the Fosse, rendering the
Canadian situation below the Crassier untenable,
and a withdrawal was ordered. The Canadians
then counterattacked and regained Alpaca
Trench, although throughout the day it kept
switching hands as one counterattack followed
another.65
It became clear in the afternoon that the
Canadian assault on the Green Crassier had
failed, and the Canadians would not be forcing
the Germans out of the central and southern
parts of Lens. The 44th Battalion reported that
15
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Canadian troops pass by German concrete bunkers in Lens.

elements of four German divisions were operating
against them.66 Brigadier-General Hilliam had
no choice but to order the withdrawal for the
Battalion because of the casualties suffered
and the little ground held. Obeying the order,
however, was impossible for “D” Company on top
of the Green Crassier, now cut off from the units
below them. Having quickly reached the top of
the Crassier, the men had turned their efforts to
consolidating their position. Unfortunately, the
surface of the Crassier was loose slag and rail
tracks, and it was impossible to dig dugouts and
trenches. At 0430 hours, they had sent a message
asking for ammunition, as well as sandbags and
timber to build some sort of defensive position.
The supplies, however, could not be delivered
because of heavy fighting below them.67
As the night descended on the Green Crassier,
all communications between “D” Company and
the rest of the Canadian Corps were cut off. Going
up or down the Crassier became impossible as
the routes were covered on three sides by enemy
machine gun fire while the fourth side was a cliff
which fell away into the river below. German
mortars and artillery kept relentless pressure
on the Manitobans’ position atop the Crassier
throughout the night.68 Ed Garrison, a private
in the 44th Battalion, remembered trying to get
a message to the top of the Crassier:
They were trying to get across with the messages…
and we couldn’t do anything about it really. There
was a sniper there and we couldn’t do anything
about it and then we got back to Battalion and
we stayed there all night…”69

No attempt to relieve the men on the Crassier
was made the following day as it had been decided
that any attempt would cost too many lives. The
survivors, though completely cut off, continued
to fight resolutely; holding off strong German

parties trying to take their position throughout
the night, but by the afternoon of the 24th the
men had run out of ammunition and Mills bombs
and the survivors were forced to surrender. Allen
Hart, another private in the 44th, recounted
what the men clinging to the Crassier had gone
through:
Well of course everything was anything but lovely
because these boys got over there and it was - it
was not a small show, it was a big show, and it
hadn’t been realized for some reason or other,
hadn’t been realized how big an undertaking it
was, so these boys got up there ... those that
weren’t killed were captured.70

In 36 hours of fighting, the 44th suffered 260
casualties including 70 who had been taken
prisoner.
With the 50th Battalion finally consolidating
Aloof Trench on the 25th, the fighting in the
Lens/Hill 70 area was done.71 In all the Canadians
had suffered almost 4,000 casualties from 21-25
August.72 The corps had not achieved any of its
initial objectives and had finally withdrawn from
the city.73
Despite the corps’ bloody setback, General
Henry Horne wanted the Canadians to attack
Lens again in September and the 4th Division was
designated to prepare for this. He believed that
a converging attack southeast from Hill 70 and
northeast from the other high point overlooking
Lens, the Sallaumines Hills, would allow Lens’
capture. This attack never materialized as the
fighting in the Ypres Salient was going badly, and
GHQ ordered the Canadian Corps north to take
part in that ferocious battle. The Germans would
hold Lens for another year until the summer of
1918.
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The Canadian attack on Lens was a failure
which no amount of rationalization can sweep
away. It was the first time Canadians had fought
in an urban environment, and they suffered
heavily because they did not come up with new
tactics to deal with the difficulties associated
with combat in a warren of ruined buildings and
streets. The Canadian Corps still believed that
intensive artillery and machine gun barrages,
which had been so effective at Vimy Ridge and
Hill 70, would lead any infantry attack to success.
However, these tactics were negated by the defence
afforded by city rubble easily utilized by the
German defenders as barriers and strongpoints.
As well, tunnels throughout the city allowed the
Germans to move troops safely and quickly to
critical areas and even infiltrate behind Canadian
positions. Also preparation comparable to that
made by the troops at Vimy Ridge and Hill 70,
where they had known their objectives weeks in
advance and trained extensively in the tactics to
capture them, was not carried out at Lens.

To have achieved victory would have called
for a much larger force and resulted in still
heavier casualties. The 2nd and 4th Divisions
were waging a battle they could not win in an
urban environment using the same tactics that
had been successful a few days earlier at Hill 70.
Fortunately for the Canadian infantry, Lens was
the last time they would be sent to fight a wellprepared, determined, and reinforced enemy in
a built-up area.75
The Hill 70 and Lens operations were Currie’s
first tests as corps commander. With Hill 70 in
Canadian hands, why did Currie press the attack
into Lens so quickly? He could have pursued a
variety of different options, the most obvious
being simply to shell Lens into submission,
taking advantage of the strategic high ground
his men had seized. Currie may have believed
that after the heavy artillery bombardment from
mid-July to 15 August, with the majority of shells
being directed at Lens, any German defences had
already been pounded to so much masonry dust.
Surely the Germans would have done the logical
thing and withdrawn. Instead the enemy, with
well-prepared defensive positions (and Canadian
gunners inadvertently creating additional barriers
with every barrage), had chosen to fight, and the
first Canadian probing attacks confirmed this.
Nevertheless, the Canadians proceeded with their
plan for a major assault that in retrospect was
doomed from the start.
Thereafter, everything was done by halfmeasures, even if inadvertantly as when the

CWM EO-1870a

There was also a failure of intelligence.
Reconnaissance patrols found it difficult
– indeed, nearly impossible – to penetrate into
Lens with its maze of tunnels and ruined houses
converted into bunkers. One lesson emphasized
in an after-battle report for Hill 70 was the
importance of sound intelligence and the need
to act upon it “without hesitation.”74 But the
4th Division possessed a very sketchy picture
of what the Canadian infantry would face, and
put too much stock in the optimistic – but sadly
incomplete – information it had. The policy of
acting “without hesitation” on initial intelligence
had often worked well in traditional trench
warfare situations, but when used in Lens it, too,

could lead to disaster, a good example being the
50th Battalion’s ill-fated attack on 20 August.

Two Canadian soldiers exit a
German tunnel on the outskirts
of Lens. The network of tunnels
allowed the Germans to remain
safely underground while their
artillery pummelled the Canadian
attackers on the surface.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2008

Jackson - Lens.indd 17

17
13

26/02/2008 9:48:15 AM

Canadian Military History, Vol. 17 [2008], Iss. 1, Art. 2

lack of communications between battalions
and brigade headquarters resulted in the 44th
Battalion being sent alone to capture the critical
feature of the Green Crassier. Even with two
battalions the Canadians would have been
severely undermanned for the daunting task,
however. Perhaps the narrow passage of attack
allowed only two battalion to pass, but that also
should have raised alarms.
On 29 August Major-General Watson made
a written assessment of the 10th Brigade’s
performance during the attack on Lens. In it
he confirms that poor communication was the
reason for the 50th Battalion’s failure to support

the 44th Battalion: “Through a misunderstanding
this attack never materialized.”76 Though the 50th
Battalion would have helped the 44th Battalion,
it was so badly beaten up from the previous days’
fighting that it would not have made a difference
in the outcome of the attack on the Green
Crassier. Brigadier-General Hilliam, evidently did
not realize that this was a major operation, and
consequently made a critical error when he did
not call for more than two battalions. Also, the
50th battalion was told of its involvement in the
battle much too late for it to have been prepared.
It is, moreover, puzzling that the 50th Battalion
was not then sent up later in the morning as
reinforcements. Major-General Watson left the
decision to attack the Green Crassier up to
Hilliam, therefore Brigadier-General Hilliam
bears responsibility for the sacrifice of the 44th
Battalion. As such, the 10th Brigade’s lack of
communication with the battalions was not only
to blame. Hilliam’s decision when the brigade
was unprepared led to the massacre of the 44th
Battalion.
A compelling argument for the attack into
Lens could be that Currie was feeling pressure
from Field Marshal Haig and General Horne to
push the attack until the city fell. As has already
been pointed out, Horne, after the Lens operation
was called off, told Currie to prepare to attack
again, an attack which was cancelled only when it
became necessary to free up the Canadian Corps
to participate in the fighting at Passchendaele.
Still, there is no direct evidence that Currie was
reluctant to attack the city.
Perhaps this period was the beginning of
Currie’s own “learning curve.” As an untested
corps commander, did he feel insecure in his
position and give in to his superiors, having
gained an important advantage by taking Hill 70?
It is also possible that overconfidence helped to
propel the Canadian Corps towards their assault
on Lens. The success at Vimy Ridge in April,
coupled with the overwhelming success achieved
at Hill 70, could have given Currie and his senior
staff officers and commanders an understandable
sense of hubris, leading them to believe that if
they just kept on pushing the Germans, they
would succeed.
Top: Canadian troops in trenches at Lens.
Bottom: The remains of a German concrete, iron and
pitprop reinforced house near Lens.
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Canadian troops move up a communications trench amidst the ruins of a suburb of Lens.

Currie, as senior Commander of the Canadian
Corps, must shoulder some responsibility for the
Green Crassier battle, as he did not call off the
corps’ operations in Lens after the disastrous
events of 21 August. It is understandable that
Currie did not want to delay the attack on Lens
any further, as there had already been a month
heavy shelling of Lens, and further artillery fire
would not result in a better outcome. However,
he should not have allowed Canadian troops
to continue to attack until the 25th. As Currie
matured and acquired more experience as a
corps commander in the latter part of 1917
and through 1918, he certainly showed sounder
judgment. This is clearly demonstrated in his
behaviour during the German spring 1918
offensives and the way he dictated how the
Canadians would be used in the “Last Hundred
Days” campaign.
The twin battles of Hill 70, a stunning
success, and Lens, a bloody setback that did
nothing to disrupt German deployments, are
prime illustrations of the position of the Canadian
Corps in their “learning curve” in the summer of
1917. Lens, despite the tendency of historians to
gloss over the full scale of the failure, provides
evidence that even this renowned and capable
formation could make fatal miscalculations.
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